Recent individual level analyses have detailed a progressive polarization between political parties in public concern and understanding of climate change. These micro political analyses are limited by the data and time-scale available in the use of a single surveying organization and instrument. In this paper, we employ macro political analysis of all relevant polling data available on the Roper iPoll Database to develop reliable and valid measures of aggregate public concern over the issue of climate change across a 13-year time-period. Aggregate public opinion is analyzed and separated by political ideology and party identification using Stimson"s (1999) method for pooling multiple polls. Through statistical analysis of six measures of aggregate public opinion trends, we find significant differences between trends in public concern across political and ideological lines, and find that the political right and political left Environmental Management and Sustainable Development ISSN 2164-7682 2015 www.macrothink.org/emsd 2 have not only become more polarized on the issue of climate change between 2001 and 2013, but that the populations are not moving as parallel publics as previous literature suggests they might.
Introduction
Individual-level analyses have detailed a progressive polarization between political parties in public concern about climate change (Guber 2013 , McCright 2011 , but these analyses are often plagued by limitations in the availability of repeated survey items that track this issue over time. We have overcome previous limitations by developing separate quarterly measures of concern over global climate change by both party affiliation and political ideology utilizing Stimson"s method of constructing aggregate public opinion measures (Stimson 1999) . This aggregate measure of climate change concern is based on data from 69 surveys administered between 2001 and 2013. These measures present us with a significant divide between the political right and the political left. We also show that polarization in climate change concern has grown over the 13-year time period, and that these populations are not moving as "parallel publics" as previous literature suggests ( Kellstedt 2003, Enns and Kellstedt 2008) .
In a 2014 Gallup Poll, 83% of Democrats and only 38% of Republicans expressed concern over climate change, and several individual-level analyses detailed this progressive polarization (Guber 2013 , McCright 2011 , Krosnick et al 2006 . There is, however, a great deal of variation in the data collected at the individual-level. For example, in Pew Research Center"s 2014 report, 50% of Republicans indicated concern over climate change, with Democrats at 81%. While there has been some important work in this area, the existing analyses are limited in time-scale, to a single data source, and by question wording. McCright and Dunlap (2011) for instance, report an increase in political polarization on the subject of climate change but their study uses only annual data and relies exclusively on questions derived from Gallup polls. Guber (2013) also finds a polarization in climate change concern, but her analyses only examine changes across three cross-sectional polls administered at 10-year intervals, again drawing only from Gallup. While these individual-level studies do help identify the polarized nature of the debate about climate change, the data limitations from which they suffer beg for a more robust examination.
To remedy this problem, we utilize the "policy mood" approach developed by James Stimson to construct six separate climate change indices. With these indices, we present a robust indicator of the quarterly shifts in climate change concern between 2001 and 2013, disaggregated by party affiliation and political ideology, as well as for the overall population. Unlike prior studies in this area, this approach will allow us to incorporate all of the available U.S. national public opinion polls on climate change rather than relying on just one poll or organization. We compare these groups, and conclude with observations on the utility of these measures and areas for future research. This type of aggregation allows us to tell a more complete story than do individual-source analyses, by including a diverse set of survey items on climate change concern derived from multiple polling organizations, with questions administered multiple times per year.
Macro Politics and Aggregate Analysis
There are two different approaches to the measurement of public opinion. The first and most common is the analysis of micro politics. Based in psychology, this approach analyzes the individual-level characteristics that produce variations in specific attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors through the use of survey research. The second approach to the study of public opinion is known as macro politics. Instead of focusing on the individual, the unit of analysis is public opinion data aggregated to some larger unit (typically, the entire country). This approach focuses on the structural conditions that may drive changes in aggregate public opinion over time (Erikson et al 2002 , Stimson 2004 . Given that this research aims to study macro-level phenomenon and the movement of U.S. public concern over climate change across time, a macro political approach is more appropriate for this analysis (Keele 2007).
Periodic surveys of public opinion related to climate change have very recently been developed 1 , but many years will pass before these measures provide sufficient cases to estimate shifts using time-series techniques. In addition, these surveys will do little to capture data from the past due to inconsistencies in question wording and survey administration. In 2012, Brulle et al developed the first valid trend measure of this subject, the Climate Change Threat Index (CCTI), for the years 2002 through 2010 using Stimson"s "Policy Mood" analysis (Brulle 2012 , Stimson 1999 . In his research, Stimson developed an algorithm to measure "policy moods" over time by using all existing survey data related to a particular social issue to construct a longitudinal index of public opinion.
Stimson"s "Policy Mood" analysis and algorithm have been effectively applied to a number of topics in sociology and political science (Kellstedt 2003 , Kellstedt et al 2008 , Brulle 2013 , Ramirez 2013 , Krosnick 2006 . There are several advantages of this aggregate approach over individual-level analyses. By developing an aggregate "Policy Mood", the Stimson algorithm can provide more accurate measures of issue or policy concern because it can utilize all the available survey data about a particular subject. The use of an algorithm to mathematically standardize data across multiple polling organizations has the advantage of minimizing the influence of researcher discretion in their specific survey item selection, and allows the measure to be invariant with respect to differences in question wording across polling organizations (Stimson 1999) . A more complete explanation of Stimson"s methodology and algorithm can be found in the Methods section of this paper.
Parallel Publics
The literature on aggregate public opinion measures posits that "parallel publics" exist, and that for some portions of the public, opinion is stable and fixed mainly by social and ideological identities (Enns and Kellstedt 2008 , Brulle 2012 , Kellstedt 2010 . However, micro-political literature also shows a widening partisan divide on the issue of climate change, which indicates that individuals may be responding differently to media coverage and political cues depending on their own political beliefs. Furthermore, recent studies show that self-identified liberals and democrats are more likely than political conservatives to report beliefs consistent with the scientific consensus about climate change (IPCC 2013) , and that the ideological and partisan gap in climate change beliefs has increased significantly between 2001 and 2010 (Guber 2013 , McCright 2011 . A macro-political approach to this question, which has not been explored prior to this study, will allow for the testing of the existence of "parallel publics" on this subject.
Building on this literature, we seek to use a more robust, aggregate-level analysis to ask the following questions: 1) Does the gap in concern over climate change between Republican and Democrats (or Conservatives and Liberals) increase between 2001 and 2013?; and 2) Do the ideological and partisan groups move as "parallel publics" in their climate change concern over this 13-year time period? We answer these questions using Stimson"s algorithm to calculate a public mood using all available polling data since 2001. Doing so will help improve our understanding of the ideological divide in climate change beliefs by applying a more vigorous and reliable measure of public opinion.
Methods
In applying Stimson"s methodology, survey marginals for responses of interest are compiled from all relevant questions, making each nationwide survey a single data point. These data points can then be analyzed over time, using Stimson"s algorithm. 8 The algorithm examines the relationship between the marginals, and places each survey on a common metric of ratios by comparing the survey marginal for a question with itself across time. The algorithm then averages the questions across question and time using backward and forward recursion, filling in missing data along the way (Kellstedt 2010). This develops a measure of central tendency, creating a comparable metric for each survey question. The resulting variations in the metric are used to measure the "policy mood." One important advantage of this methodology is that existing data can be used to calculate any missing data, for example, in a year in which no survey was asked during a particular quarter. This aspect of the methodology solves a historical problem in measuring public opinion over time with traditional social research methodologies.
To measure and examine public opinion on climate change we constructed several time-series using data drawn from the Roper Center iPoll database. The database was searched for poll questions containing the words "climate change" or "global warming" and questions were selected from the search results that asked respondents to assess the level of threat they perceive from climate change. Our search identified 20 different questions from 8 different polling organizations that asked about climate change. For the majority of these polls, respondents were asked to indicate their political ideology and/or their party affiliation. Using this political identification data, combined with questions related to climate change, we were able to calculate both an Ideology Climate Change Threat Index (ICCTI) and a Party Climate Change threat Index (PCCTI). Table S1 , and the variable loadings for the commonality estimates can be seen in Table S3 , both in the supplementary material accompanying this article online. The method of data collection for each survey variable was consistent across all of the administrations, insuring the comparability of the survey marginals across the time period 4 . The survey marginal scores were processed through Stimson"s algorithm using the WCALC program 5 to calculate the ICCTI and PCCTI on a quarterly basis. For the ICCTI this included three indices for conservatives, liberals, and all respondents. For the PCCTI the three indices were for Republicans, Democrats, and all respondents. Using these separate series, we are able to make meaningful comparisons about public concern over climate change separated by political identification between 2001 and 2013.
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The distribution of the surveys including climate change concern questions used for the PCCTI and ICCTI are shown in Table S2 in the online supplementary material. It should be noted that in 2004, only three questions were available from the database, and these were all asked in the first quarter of the year. The data from the other three quarters are interpolated by averaging survey marginals from the first quarter of 2004 and from the first quarter of 2005. The use of the Stimson algorithm allows for this missing data to be interpolated and filled in, but it should be noted that the measurement is not as robust for 2004 as it is in other years.
A two-tailed, Pearson correlation was performed to determine whether the ICCTI and the PCCTI were comparable given the small differences in the included survey administrations (Table 2) . We find that the PCCTI and ICCTI were highly correlated with an r value of .990, and a significance at of p< .001.
Results
A longitudinal measure of public climate change concern was constructed by applying the Stimson algorithm to the polling data drawn from the Roper iPoll database. The demographic data from these surveys was used to create two indices for all respondents (PCCTI and ICCTI) 6 , and one index each for Republicans, Democrats, conservatives, and liberals. Descriptive statistics for the indices are shown in Table 1 and the graphed indices over the 13-year time period can be seen in Figure 1 . Table 1 and Figure 1 show distinct separation between the political left (Democrats and liberals) and the political right (Republicans and conservatives) in the mean aggregate scores and the trend across the time series. The significance between the two political and ideological extremes, and the apparent increase in the gap between these extremes, are analyzed below to answer the research questions.
With the comparability of the PCCTI and ICCTI established in the Methods section, Pearson correlations were run between all of the indices ( Table 2 ). The results show that the liberal and Democratic indices vary together (r=.876, p<.001), as do the conservative and Republican indices (r=.905, p<.001 ). It appears that public concern about climate change is not influenced by whether one measures climate change "mood" by party or by political ideology. There is, however, a sizable difference (Figure 1 ) between the political left and political right in their climate change concern. The correlations presented in Table 2 show that a statistically significant difference in climate change concern exists between Republicans and Democrats (.083, p>.05 ) and between conservatives and liberals (r=.055, p>.05). When we compile all available polling data since 2001, it is clear that climate change has been exceptionally polarized for both party affiliation and political ideology. To further analyze the relationship between the political right and the political left, we calculate a set of gap scores indicating the difference between our CCTI scores for party and ideology. Figure 2 shows partisan and ideological gaps for the climate change threat indices across the time period. A larger gap between groups suggest a greater divide in concern on the issue of climate change, while smaller gap numbers suggest that the groups are closer in opinion. We see from Figure 2 that the gap in 2013 was twice that of 2001, indicating that climate change concern has grown substantially more politically polarized. Also, we see that the gap between Republicans and Democrats is consistently higher than it is between liberals and conservatives To test the difference in the movements of the indices, and determine whether these groups move in parallel, several statistical analyses were employed. Tests of the difference of means reveal that the CCTI for Liberals, M liberals = 60.70, is higher than the average concern amongst Conservatives, M conservative = 30.52 (t=34.78, p<.001). A similarly significant gap also exists between Democrats and Republicans. Descriptive statistics also reveal that those on the right of the political spectrum appear to be more willing than those on the left to change their position over time about climate change. Specifically, the range of movement for Conservatives (18.2) is larger than the range for Liberals (14.8).
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While a substantial gaps can be seen in Figure 2 between the positions of those on the political left and those on the political right, we must rely on statistical evidence to determine whether or not these separate trends move in parallel. A simple t-test reveals that the mean gaps between 
Discussion and Conclusion
Utilizing Stimson"s algorithm and "policy mood" technique, we find that individuals on the political left and the political right had significantly different levels of concern for climate change between 2001 and 2013, and that the polarization between these two groups has increased over this time period. In particular, the mood measure of the political right dropped by nearly half between 2007 and 2010. Since 2006, Liberals and Democrats showed more concerned, while Republicans and conservatives were less concerned in 2013 than they have been since the beginning of our time-series. Our findings of a growing partisan and ideological divide in public climate change concern are further supported by simple calculations of the gap, or the difference between partisan and ideological average threat index scores. The increase in the partisan gap between 2001 and 2013 supports the assertions about the polarization of the climate debate made in much of the recent literature, but does so using a more appropriate and methodologically stronger, aggregate-level approach (Guber 2013 , McCright 2011 , Brulle 2012 , Kellstedt et al 2008 .
Several statistic analyses were employed to determine whether or not the political left and the political right move in parallel for these measures. We find a significant gap between the political left and the political right in the difference of mean, a difference in the range of motion in public concern, and statistically significant mean gaps in each year of the study. These ISSN 2164 -7682 2015 findings challenge arguments made in previous literature in which aggregate opinion measures from subsets of the population move in parallel across groups (Kellstedt 2003 , Enns and Kellstedt 2008 , Kellstedt et al 2008 . Our findings indicate that for climate change concern across party lines, this does not hold true.
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Using Stimson"s "policy mood" technique allowed for the inclusion of more survey data, from a more diverse set of polling organizations than previous scholarship has been able to utilize without such an approach. Our more robust mood measure disaggregated by the political right and left allowed us to precisely track the increase in polarization on this issue. We also found that climate change concern over time moves independently between the political right and the political left. Future scholarship should work to reveal what factors influence the concern of the different, politically divided populations, and to uncover ways of moving the public past the partisan sorting and the resulting stalemate on climate change in the U.S. Which of the following statements reflects your view of when the effects of global warming will begin to happen? They have already begun to happen. They will start happening within a few years. They will start happening within your lifetime. They will not happen within your lifetime, but they will affect future generations. They will never happen. 
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